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This article critiques Stanley Fish's argument for speech regulation. 
Fish errs in reducing free speech to a mere means, viewing free speech 
as a "conceptual impossibility," and making the limited speech rights of 
the modern workplace a standard for assessing speech rights in general. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article critique l 'argument de Stanley Fish en faveur de la 
régulation de la parole. Fish se trompe:(l) en n'accordant à la liberté de 
parole qu'une valeur instrumentale; (2) en voyant dans la parole libre 
une "impossibil i t ié conceptuelle;" (3) en faisant des droits limités 
existant dans le lieu de travail moderne un critère pour l'évaluation des 
droits en général. 
168 P. Ryan 
Stanley Fish (1994) offers one of the best-known defenses of speech 
regulation against free speech "purists." Fish argues that some limits on 
freedom of speech are defensible, a modest thesis to which this author 
has no objection. But he grounds this thesis upon a quite dangerous 
foundation, one that leaves it unclear why one should care about free-
dom at all. I will examine three arguments advanced by Fish: (1) free 
speech is a mere means to other ends, hence the defense of free speech is 
a disguised defense of some "substantive" agenda; (2) formal speech 
regulation does not limit free speech, since speech is always regulated; 
(3) a university is just another workplace, and workplace speech is 
always controlled. Following Fish, I will focus on campus speech issues, 
though many issues raised here are relevant to society in general. 
FISH'S ARGUMENT 
Free speech is a mere means 
The defense of free speech, Fish argues, requires that one adopt the 
"nonconsequentialist" position that free speech is "asserted and honored 
simply for itself," rather than as a means to some other end (p. 14). But 
"no one can maintain" this stance, Fish holds: Ronald Dworkin, for 
example, tries do to so, yet accepts limits on the speech rights of "the 
young and the incompetent." But this can only be because: 
the young and the incompetent are not capable of making 
good use of the speech that freely comes their way; but that 
means that free speech is envisioned as having a point exter-
nal to itself — something like the furthering of rational delib-
eration — and that, it hardly seems necessary to say, is a 
consequentialist position (p. 14). 
Hence, free speech "is not a prime but a subordinate value" (p. 14). 
Free speech "is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the 
substantive agendas we wish to advance" (p. 102).1 Thus, "it makes per-
fect sense to desire the silencing of beliefs inimical to yours, because if 
you do not so desire, it would be an indication that you did not believe in 
your bel iefs" (p. 118). Any Catholic who does not wish to muzzle 
Protestants, it appears, is a less-than-devoted follower of Rome.2 If one 
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supports racial equality, one will support controls on any speech that 
appears to question the goal, or even that questions certain possible 
means towards the goal, such as affirmative action. Conversely, if one 
resists such speech controls, it is probably because one does not share 
the "substantive agenda" of racial equality. Free speech is among the 
"ideologically charged constructions of a decidedly political agenda," 
the agenda of neoconservatism (p. 19). 
Fish's argument depends upon two false assumptions. The first is 
that the world can be neatly divided between means and ends: one might 
support free speech as a good-in-itself or as a means to some other end, 
but not as both. To Glaucon's question "Is there a kind [of good] we like 
both for its own sake and for what comes out of it, such as thinking and 
seeing and being healthy?" (Plato, trans. 1968, para. 357b), Fish clearly 
answers in the negative. But why? If I pin my son's arms to his sides, he 
resists: not necessarily because he wants to do anything in particular 
with his arms at that moment, but just because. My son does not yet 
know the word for freedom, but he recognizes freedom's absence, and 
he does not like it. On the other hand, it is obvious that the free move-
ment of his arms is also a means to a wide variety of ends (many of 
which are not entirely shared by his parents). Likewise, if we are 
forcibly silenced, we will resent this not merely because it prevents us 
from attaining some particular objective through speech, but because we 
treasure the right to speak as something valuable in itself. 
One might respond here that, if we perceive restrictions upon our 
speech as an affront to our autonomy and dignity, then free speech is a 
mere means to autonomy and dignity. But then we must add that speech 
is also a means to sociability, romance, poetic self-expression, meeting 
our physical needs, and so on. But a means to such a wide variety of 
ends does not stand in relation to any particular end as a mere means to 
which it is entirely subordinate. 
Fish's second assumption is that if some good is an end-in-itself, it 
must be an absolute end, capable of trumping all others in all circum-
stances. Indeed, it would seem by his logic that there can only be one 
end in this world, though Fish does not tell us what he thinks it is. 
Therefore any limitation on a particular good indicates that it is not in 
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fact an end-in-itself, but a mere means.3 This assumption is also unten-
able. The things we value for their own sake often come into conflict 
with one another, and the fact that one good gives way in a particular sit-
uation does not point to some immutable ranking of our goods.4 Despite 
my son's preference for freedom of movement, if I hold him still to clip 
his finger nails, he generally acquiesces. We should not infer from this 
that he values clipped nails more than freedom. 
Fish's position that free speech is not an end-in-itself is without 
merit, because he has misunderstood what it means for something to be 
valued for its own sake. Indeed, since for Fish an end would only exist if 
it could always trump all other goods, the social equality he apparently 
advocates would suffer the same fate as free speech if subjected to his 
own logic. Let us offer all North Americans absolute equality with one 
another, on the condition that all will live at the material level of a 
Liberia or a Bangladesh. How many will opt for equality? And if some-
one does not, are we to conclude that equality for that person is a "mere 
means" to some other end? And what precisely is that untrumpable end? 
Speech is always regulated 
Fish defends speech control on the grounds that "regulation of 
speech is constitutive of meaningful discourse" (p. 129). But his argu-
ment is built upon a dangerously multivocal concept of "regulation." In 
the first instance, individuals self-regulate, in the sense of using the rules 
of grammar, syntax, and relevance in order to produce meaningful 
speech. One cannot produce meaningful speech without "an in-built 
sense of what it would be meaningless to say" (p. 103): my son no 
longer babbles, but speaks. 
Dialogue is also dependent upon, and therefore in a sense "regu-
lated" by, some shared sense of the world, a "background understanding 
of the possible courses of physical or verbal actions and their possible 
consequences" (p. 115).5 In addition, one is ordinarily "limited by the 
decorums you are required to internalize before entering" a specific situ-
ation (p. 129). In any community, "limitations on speech in relation to a 
defining and deeply assumed purpose are inseparable from community 
membership" (p. 108). 
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All of this should make us feel better about bureaucratically-admin-
istered speech controls: such controls do not restrain free speech, but 
simply add another form of regulation to speech that is already regu-
lated. But Fish has collapsed a whole variety of "regulations" onto one 
level. The guiding assumption is that regulation is regulation, whether it 
be the self-regulation of the individual who makes creative use of the 
rules of syntax and semantics to produce intelligible speech, or the often 
informal and fluid self-regulation of the social group that sustains local 
norms of appropriateness, or bureaucratically-imposed speech codes. 
Regulation is the important thing: who is doing the regulating, or 
whether one submits to it voluntarily, is irrelevant. We are, then, always 
implicated in a profoundly restrictive situation. Given speech restriction 
by our inaccessible background assumptions and our norms of decorum, 
bureaucratic speech codes seem less problematic: they merely chip away 
a little at a freedom that in any case is illusory. "Freedom of speech is a 
conceptual impossibility" (p. 115). 
A major component of Fish's argument is the reification of both 
"background understanding" and norms of social appropriateness, which 
are then endowed with all the coercive quality of bureaucratic regula-
tion. Fish claims that the "background" we assume whenever we speak 
is inaccessible to consciousness (p. 115). Rather than seeing this taken-
for-granted sense of things as part of what Michael Polanyi (1962) calls 
our "subsidiary awareness," a level of awareness that can in principle be 
made "focal," Fish lodges it in something approximating the Freudian 
unconscious. 
But anyone who has ever engaged in a reflective dialogue knows 
how speech can turn upon many of its own assumptions, how the taken-
for-granted of one moment can become the theme of discussion at the 
next. Fish simply ignores this lived experience, by assuming that the 
questioning of assumptions requires that one be freed of all background 
assumptions at once. Fish, who identifies background assumptions with 
ideology, holds that we cannot get "beyond or around ideology" (p. 115), 
because this operation would require a "cleared and ideology-free space" 
(p. 116). Similarly: "With what does one either transcend belief or 
loosen its hold? The answer can only be with a part of the mind that is 
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itself not already occupied by belief, some aspect of the self that stands 
to the side of commitments and affiliations" (p. 20).6 
But the answer to Fish's query suggests itself the moment one stops 
speaking of belief in the singular, as if it were a monolithic, non-contra-
dictory thing. Just as a deep sea diver uses water as the medium to move 
beyond water (Teilhard de Chardin, 1957/1964, p. 107), discussants use 
some background assumptions as part of the medium through which 
other assumpt ions are called into question. Fish might argue that 
"behind" the assumptions that we can question there is another entirely 
inaccessible layer of assumptions. How might he prove this assertion? 
He cannot actually name any particular inaccessible assumption, for to 
name it is to gain "access" to it. Fish might answer that we can identify 
such inaccessible assumptions retrospectively, after they have lost our 
hold on us. But we should not simply suppose that assumptions that were 
not articulated could not be articulated, a variant of the "retrospective 
fallacy" (Mandelbaum, 1971, p. 134).7 At best we can say that one can-
not rule out a realm of inaccessible assumptions, much as Kant held that 
we cannot rule out the realm of noumena. But this does not permit one to 
consign the bulk of our beliefs to such a realm and endow them with 
coercive power, as Fish does. 
Fish attempts a similar operation with social norms. These norms are 
grounded in the "deeply assumed purpose" that defines the community. 
Whence comes this "deeply assumed purpose"? Is it consciously 
assumed by all members of a community? Can it be made the object of 
reflection and critique? Fish never suggests this possibility, and his argu-
ment must assume the opposite: if group purposes are subject to critique, 
any speech limitations grounded upon them are merely provisional, sub-
ject to the ongoing negotiation of the group, and the qualitative differ-
ence be tween such l imitat ions and bureaucrat ic speech control is 
highlighted. For Fish, then, all of these social purposes and rules of 
decorum, like our background assumptions, are simply given, and inac-
cessible to critique through speech itself. 
But we must bear in mind that we use norms of appropriateness as 
much as we submit to them.8 They provide a necessary medium of com-
munication, we signal membership through them. As Fish well knows, 
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we may even make ironic use of them, flouting them as part of a per-
sonal performance, or to draw particular attention to an utterance, or to 
call into question those norms themselves. In short, they are as much a 
medium through which we act as a restraint upon action. We can often 
turn upon these norms, analyze them, and transform them. Is this the 
case for bureaucratically imposed regulation? Such regulation can cer-
tainly be challenged and transformed. But while Fish's "decorums" can 
only be sustained through their continual enactment by agents them-
selves, bureaucratic regulation is quite a bit more solid. 
This does not mean that one should always shun bureaucratic regula-
tion and embrace groups' informal self-regulation. If a group's norms, for 
example, uphold sexism or racism, and if those norms serve to exclude 
from the group those who would have the most interest in challenging the 
norms, then a case exists for bureaucratic regulation of the group. The 
argument is rather that "background assumptions," group norms, and 
bureaucratic rules are entirely different forms of social regulation, and 
Fish cannot defend one form by pointing to the existence of another. 
Even if one rejected the above argument, and held that one form of 
regulation is every bit as solid and coercive as another, one would still 
need to show why one form ought to be supplemented by the other. The 
argument, after all, could run in the exact opposite direction. We can 
draw upon an analogy with the Marxian argument around false con-
sciousness. Our consciousness is always "false" to some degree: we 
never fully grasp the conditions under which we live, nor even our own 
aspirations and needs. Unfortunately, history is full of examples of those 
who invoke this more or less false consciousness as the ground for 
authoritarianism. But the insight that we are a mystery to ourselves can 
lead us instead to recognize our need for a free dialogue in order to elu-
cidate our situation and hopes. Analogously, while Fish invokes the 
invisible limits upon our freedom to justify quite visible additional lim-
its, one could as easily argue that the constraints of our background 
assumptions and social norms, to the extent that they are coercive con-
straints, can only be attenuated through free dialogue. 
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Shipyards don't have free speech, why should universities? 
Fish argues that we err in seeing the university as a "free-speech 
forum." He would prefer that we view it as "a workplace where people 
have contractual obligations, assigned duties, pedagogical and adminis-
trative responsibilities, and so on" (p. 128). Having eliminated from his 
conception of the university everything that makes it a university, Fish 
can proceed to apply norms arising from a court case involving a Florida 
shipyard: "the workplace, the court stated, is for working, and therefore 
an ' "employer may lawfully withhold its consent for employees to 
engage in expressive act ivi t ies '" that might cause "special harms" 
(p. 128). As with any other workplace, the scope for free speech "will 
vary with the underlying purpose for which some social space has been 
organized" (p. 129). 
We must note, first, the impersonal formulation: the social space has 
been organized, and its "underlying purpose" is simply given. Neither 
the "space" nor its purpose are for Fish the subject of ongoing discus-
sion. It is puzzling that Fish, for whom a text can have no inherent mean-
ing prior to an act of interpretation (p. 300), believes that group purposes 
exist as things-in-themselves, and do not require any interpretation. This 
reification of organizational goals often serves the purpose of masking 
the imposition of someone's ends upon someone else.9 
Fish declares that any "institution" has a "core rationale," and when 
this is threatened, "it will respond by declaring" that "of course" this or 
that subversive speech is not to be tolerated (p. 104). But when institu-
tions are said to "respond," when they are endowed with speech, we are 
in the presence of ventriloquism, and clarity requires that we identify 
just who is making the dummy's lips move. It is clear from Fish's expo-
sition that it is the employer who will speak for the institution, and who 
is vested with the right to "withhold its consent" to freedom in the name 
of this "underlying purpose." 
Many objections can be raised here. The most general is whether we 
really want a world like this. The capitalist workplace — in which it is 
up to the employer to decide which limited freedoms the employees will 
enjoy— is certainly a fact of life. But do we wish to invoke that work-
place as a norm? More specifically, why do we wish to mold the 
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university to the model of the capitalist workplace? Do we want free-
doms within the university to be subject to an "underlying purpose" 
defined and protected by the administration? Does experience suggest 
that these actors are likely to be trustworthy guardians of the university's 
"underlying purpose"? Have they proven themselves to be stalwart as 
age-old trees, or are they weather vanes, twisting this way and that in the 
face of lawsuits, government pressure, or public relations concerns? No 
study of the history of the North American university can fill us with 
confidence in this regard. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE 
Nothing in the foregoing would support an absolute free speech 
position. In fact, the thesis of the plurality of ends rules out such a posi-
tion as much as it does Fish's own. But are we not then engaged in a 
trivial debate with Fish over different ways of justifying a shared posi-
tion? Not at all. One's approach to free speech issues is greatly affected 
by: (1) viewing free speech as both a means and an end-in-itself rather 
than as a mere means; (2) recognizing the specificity of bureaucratic reg-
ulation, rather than erasing the distinction between regulation, "back-
ground assumptions," and social norms; (3) recognizing how difficult it 
is to identify an appropriate agent of speech controls, rather than handing 
speech rights over to the "employer" and hoping for the best. 
First, when we neatly chop the world into means and ends, the for-
mer are readily sacrificed to the latter: why not give up "a lot" of free-
dom in order to gain "a little" justice or equality? Instead, we may view 
free speech as one of various ends, ends that can conflict with one 
another in certain cases.10 This perspective puts a clear onus on those 
who would limit a certain good to make a clear demonstration of the 
conflict between ends, and an argument concerning the concrete trade-
off that must be made. In this approach, one cannot simply jump from 
the assertion that "speech-related injuries may be grievous and deeply 
wounding" (p. 109) to speech controls. One would both demand clear 
evidence of serious harm, and seek out remedies to this harm that mini-
mize the impact on freedom. In particular, if one cherishes freedom, one 
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can begin by asking whether harms can be addressed by expanding the 
scope of freedom rather than limiting it, for example by balancing rela-
tions in the classroom so that students can respond more freely to profes-
sorial speech, offensive or otherwise. 
Our second criticism of Fish concerns his failure to appreciate the 
specificity of bureaucratic regulation. Recognition of the special nature 
of formal regulations, of their heightened tendency, for example, to pro-
voke "backlashes," must lessen the tendency to "see evil and think law" 
(Jacoby, 1994, p. 79), and encourage the search for a l te rna t ive 
a p p r o a c h e s to the conf l i c t be tween f ree speech and other ends . 
Reluctance to impose bureaucratic regulation of speech does not require 
"that we endure whatever pain racist and hate speech inflicts for the sake 
of a future whose emergence we can only take on faith," as Fish would 
have it (p. 109). It merely requires that we first seek responses to such 
speech that do not strip adversaries of their own right of reply. 
One such response involves the mobilization of informal norms of 
conduct. Informal norms, of course, have often been mobilized on cam-
pus to oppose speech deemed harmful. Ironically, however, the same 
identification of formal regulation and informal norms assumed by Fish 
has also served the "anti-PC" cause well. As Russell Jacoby (1994) 
notes, anti-PC writers such as Dinesh D'Souza demonstrate a "worri-
some confusion," identifying verbal protests against speech deemed 
racist or sexist with "censorship" (p. 47). In the same way, self-restraint 
is equated with self-censorship and moral cowardice, and held to be even 
worse than censorship itself ." Thus we must assert the distinction 
between formal control and informal norms not only against Fish, but 
against his ostensible antagonists. 
Our third criticism of Fish concerns the problem of determining 
exactly who is to be trusted with the power to impose speech controls, 
and how exactly these guardians of campus harmony are themselves to 
be guarded. Fish is happy to turn the matter over to the "employer." He 
brushes aside the concern that controls will themselves get out of con-
trol: there is no "slippery slope" case to be made against speech controls, 
he asserts, because "somewhere along the route some asserted interest 
will stop the slide" (p. 130). But there is no reason to expect a particular 
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interest that has the power to assert its own speech rights to do much for 
the speech rights of those less well-placed. 
Thus, even if one would endorse formal speech controls of a specific 
type, the problem of agency and the possibility that controls will evolve 
in unpredictable directions should give one pause. Fish would equate 
universities with shipyards: both have an "underlying purpose," and both 
should limit freedoms in keeping with their respective purposes. But the 
goal of the shipyard is no mystery: the owners seek to make money. And 
the goal of the university? Defenders of the university will articulate its 
goals in the loftiest of terms: the promotion of discovery, initiation of 
students into the culture of scholarship, redemption of human nature 
from convention and prejudice, pursuit of truth, introduction of students 
to the "best that has been thought and said." 
Such exalted purposes demand respect for the freedoms of the uni-
versity community. But the very loftiness of these goals entails that uni-
versity decision-makers will tend not to take them into account in their 
day-to-day decision-making. Organizational theorist Herbert Simon 
notes that "high-level goals provide little guide for action because it is 
difficult to measure the degree of their attainment, and because it is diffi-
cult to measure the effects of concrete actions upon them." Rather, 
"decisions tend to be made... in terms of the highest-level goals that are 
operative — the most general goals to which action can be related in a 
fairly definite way, and that provide some basis for the assessment of 
accomplishment" (1965, p. xxxvi). For the university administrator, 
operative goals will include raising money, appeasing various con-
stituencies, avoiding negative publicity, and so on. None of these goals 
requires much respect for free speech. 
Thus, there exists an obvious "constituency" for controls within the 
university. The constituency for freedom, by contrast, may always be 
fragile. Freedom may not be an issue for a substantial proportion of pro-
fessors or students who can meet their personal and professional objec-
tives without ever having to say anything particularly controversial. 
Given this distribution of interests, university freedom has probably been 
sustained to this day only by the view that it is a valuable good, a view 
from which Fish wishes to free us. Serious reflection upon the long-term 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXI, No. 2, 2001 
178 P. Ryan 
implications of overcoming this view should generally lead us to seek 
out alternative means for addressing speech conflicts, means that do not 
involve bureaucratic regulation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given Fish's position, is there anything wrong in principle with a 
McCarthyite attack on the university, or any other attack on university 
freedom that the future may bring? "Someone is always going to be 
restricted next, and it is your job to make sure that the someone is not 
you" (p. 111). If you are suppressed, Fish tells us, stop whining: you 
have simply failed to do "your job." But the cynical assertion that "the 
strong do what they have power to do and the weak accept what they 
have to accept" has always been appealing... to the strong, to those who 
"thought that nothing could go wrong with them" (Thucydides, trans. 
1954, para. 5.89, 4.65). It is hard to know why this cynicism should be 
so appealing to a university sector that is so evidently fragile. 
Fish himself would scoff at speculation concerning the long-term 
implications of his views. He is a "localist," he proudly declares, without 
a care for the future: "I tend not to think about or worry about anything 
more in the future than two hours hence" (p. 298). His writings on free 
speech, like all his actions, are meant merely to address "the local 
moment." But the printed word cannot declare its own "Best before" 
date, or establish restrictions on its own usage. The "children of the 
mind," Tawney noted, resemble those of the body: "if their parents could 
foresee their future development, it would sometimes break their hearts" 
(1954, p. 8 1 ) . * 
Notes 
' Fish buttresses his position with an odd exclusionary tactic: when speech 
is not produced in the service of some truth or preferred agenda, it by definition 
"doesn't matter" (p. 129). 
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2 Allan Bloom, one of Fish's ostensible nemeses in the "PC wars," is at one 
with Fish on this point: he writes of the times when "Catholics and Protestants 
were suspicious of and hated one another," and adds "but at least they were tak-
ing their beliefs seriously" (1987, p. 35). I have noted other points of agreement 
between writers such as Fish and the anti-PC movement in Ryan (1996b). 
3 This logical leap is not limited to Fish: Joseph Schumpeter wields a simi-
lar argument to suggest that democracy is "incapable of being an end in itself 
(1976, p. 242). 
^ To use John Rawls's terminology, there is no necessary lexical ordering 
of the goods we pursue (1971, p. 42). 
^ While the view that dialogue relies upon background assumptions is 
commonplace, Fish adds some odd twists: the background constitutes an 
"unquestioned ideological vision," though Fish does not explain what it means 
for something to be ideological. Further, this background is inaccessible to the 
speaker's "critical self-consciousness": it "constitutes the field in which con-
sciousness occurs," and is sharply distinguished from the "productions of con-
sciousness" (p. 115). 
^ For Fish, the "productions of consciousness" will always be biased "in 
ways the speaker cannot know" (p. 116). If this be true, it is hard to see how one 
can ever confidently proclaim what "the answer can only be" to any particular 
problem. One is reminded here of the sort of intellectual chided in Marx's third 
Thesis on Feuerbach, who proclaims the determined nature of all thought yet 
imagines himself free of this determination. 
^ Fish might fall back upon a trivial argument here: in the realm of sci-
ence, it seems that we can identify knowledge that was entirely beyond the 
reach of an earlier age. The theory of relativity, in this view, was once entirely 
inaccessible, and so one could argue that an entire world-view was grounded 
upon assumptions that could not be identified as such. But if this is what Fish 
means by background assumptions that limit "free speech," then his thesis 
should be rendered "There's no such thing as omniscient speech," a thesis not 
particularly relevant to the issue of bureaucratic speech codes. 
® "From the fact that beliefs and social practices penetrate us from the out-
side, one cannot conclude that we receive them passively... Each of us makes, 
to a certain extent, our own morality, religion, technique" (Durkheim, 1950, 
p. xxii). See also Giddens (1984, p. 25). 
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^ Clegg and Dunkerley note that the tendency to treat the organizational goal 
as a "thing- in-itself ' helps generate "a vocabulary — seemingly neutral, scientif-
ic and purged of value — with which organizations can appear to be administered 
as things rather than be ruled and exploited as resources" (1980, p. 211). 
' 0 As noted above, the analysis is not affected by whether we assert that 
freedom is an end-in-itself or a means to a wide variety of ends. 
1 ' I have critiqued this position in Ryan (1996a). 
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